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The Implementation of Basie II: Issues,
Challenges and Implications for Nigeria
0. K. Ibedu*

I.

T

Introduction

be significant development of Basie II throughout the world has meant that
financial institutions and insurance companies must manage and measure risk
in new ways. This paper is intended to provide the participants at the Executive

Seminar with a firm foundation ofthe state of Bas le II Accord principles and provide the
tools and techniques to grapple with its implementation.
This paper is divided into eight parts. Following this introduction, Part 2 discusses the
necessity for a capital accord, the emergence of Basle I and the Bas le II Accord. Part 3
discusses in brief the concept of Risk Management and the integrated risk management
structure. Part 4 discusses the intention of the new accord, its pillars and the entire
structure. Baste II implementation and the necessary condition for implementing the
Accord and the scope ofimplementation are discussed in part 5 and 6, respectively, while
part 7 dwells on the obstacles to a successful implementation and other challenges. Part 8
concludes the paper.
II. WhyanAccord?

Some thirty years ago, the banking world was very different as most organisations
borrowed money from banks. The borrowed funds were recorded on-balance sheets and
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typically priced at a spread over funds - hence market risk-free.

That era was

characterised by the following: credit risk was the main component of risk controlled on
a case-by-case basis by limiting the principal amount. Operational risks were only
considered a part ofbusiness while liquidity was the main regulatory constraint requiring
banks to hold a fraction oftheir assets in liquid form. Moreover, the level ofequity capital
was not a constraint as banks could lower their capital as much as they liked.
In today's world, however, organisations are increasingly using capital markets to raise
money directly but are looking up to banks to provide risk management solutions. In
addition, banking has become much more competitive and dynamic as some banking
institutions structurally changed and became experts, not only in capital intermediation
but also in risk intermediation. Furthermore, the banking world has recorded massive
risks in off-balance sheet activities through derivatives and has also taken huge market
risks to enhance profits.
In the early 1980's, with the rise of totally unregulated derivatives market, the regulators
realised that they had lost control. In 1985, the Bank of England and the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York published a paper which recommended the introduction of new
banking regulations. This formed the foundation for the first Basie Accord in 1988.
Before the First Accord, there was no international consistency ofregulation. Individual
risk profiles were ignored while risk was considered on size or business. Only balance
sheet (BS) activities were regulated, typically liquidity, despite the rapid growth in offbalance sheet items.
Objectives of the First Accord

The intention of the first Accord was to increase the capital ratios which were perceived
to be too low. It was also intended to harmonise capital requirements across G-10
countries, although many other countries complied. It was also meant to include both onand off-balance sheet activities. Off-balance sheet activities then were growing out of
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proportion and could not be accounted for because of the emergence of derivatives
products. The first accord initially considered only credit risk as that was deemed to be a
larger and more important source of risk. Market risk amendment was subsequently
introduced in 1996 to cover trading exposures only. The accord was deemed to be
broadly successful as bank's capital was significantly raised across the globe.
In mid-1990's, there were increasing complaints about the Accord which included that
credit model was a black box and was not permitting internal models, Credit model was
very risk insensitive, for instance 0.0 per cent risk weighting was allocated for
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) government, 20.0
per cent weighting for all OECD banks, 100.0 per cent for all corporate. Further
complaints were that risk mitigation was extremely primitive and limited and that the
precise role of the capital charge was unclear as banks that had developed a probabilistic
concept of Economic Capital (EC) in contrast to the Regulatory Capital (RC) charge laid
down by the Accord found out that in many instances RC was ( a lot) higher than EC. This
led to regulatory "arbitrage" such as:
•

Securitisation - removal of credit risk- freeing up RC

•

Inter-bank activity- due to the mismatch in the RC

•

Taking on market risk.

Note that this was unregulated during early 1990s.
G30 (group of30) global investment banks made 20 recommendations for good practice
for derivative dealing and end-users in their report issued in 1994 titled "Industry
Guidelines for Good Operations Practice". The Group made 20 recommendations for
good practice for derivative dealing and end-users. In particular it required defined risk
management covering senior management responsibilities, scope and authorisation of
trading, systems and controls, product valuation and adequate disclosure. The
recommendations became good standard practice in all major institutions and formed
the basis for a new accord.
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In June 1999, it was decided to replace the Accord with the objectives of maintaining at
least the current level of capital in the system, enhancing competitive equality,
containing probabilistic approaches to capital adequacy that is appropriately sensitive to
the degree of risk involved in a bank's position and activity, emphasising the
responsibility ofdirectors and senior management and focusing on internationally active
banks. The final version of the Accord was published on 26th June, 2004. This was
revised substantially in November 2005 and, it is likely to evolve further.

III.

Overview of Risk Management

Traditionally, risk management was perceived as a control centre placing constraints on
revenue generation but reacting after the event, a reporting centre with no operational
responsibilities organised by region or legal entity and staffed by relatively low-skilled
people. The modem view of risk management shows that there is a link between return,
risk and capital. A transaction exposes a bank to risk. It requires capital to cover this risk
and must ensure an adequate return on this capital. Otherwise, the value is ultimately
destroyed. Risk management is evolving from the reactive reporting of risk to the
proactive pricing ofrisk.
Integrated Risk management
Banks like all businesses have to take risks to make money. Therefore, risk taking is an
essential part ofbusiness. If return is a reward for risk taking, every level should consider
the trade-offbetween risk and return in all transactions
Portfolio Management-+ Active Risk Return
For risk management to work in a strategic fashion, it has to be perceived to be adding
value, by providing inputs into the major decision making within the bank pricing,
performance measurement, compensation.
Risk Adjusted Return on Capital (RAROC)-+Use ofeconomic capital
Risk analysis -+ VaR, Stress Tests, Scenarios
Control Management-+ Identify, monitor, avoid.
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Pricing of the transactions must include adequate risk premium so that correct pricing
becomes a strategic weapon. Risk management must be proactive, driven by the centre to
ensure consistency and staffed by skilled people who see this as a career.
IV. Intention of Basel II
The New Accord is risk sensitive ensuring that capital matches the risks, applies across
all activities of the bank and across all risks categories and has a clear understanding
about the role of capital.

What Is the Intention of Basel II?

Stimulate I conv• rgen~ of r.gul1tory driven risk
management towards economic driven risk management
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Basel II Requirements

Three pillars of Basel II
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Structure of the New Accord
Pillar 1: Capital Structure- Minimum Capital Requirement
• Market risk
• Credit risk
• Operational risk

Pillar 2: Risk-Based Supervision-Supervisory Review Process
• Different for each Bank.
• Review process.
•IRR in the banking book

Pillar 3: Market Disclosure-Enhancement of market discipline.
• Impose market discipline
• Capital
• Levels ofrisk
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Important

The pillars are mutually reinforcing. Regulators cannot rely just on pillar 1 to control
banks but must also fully implement Pillars 2 and 3. This may cause the supervisors
difficulties due to required skills.

-------------------------,
PIiiar I: Minimum Capltlll Requirement

Basel I riSk capital charge Is prtmarlly focused on Cl'edlt risk and subsequently
market r1Sk (1996 Amendments):

......,_(CAIII
__..,....,Clfllll
....,. ___________
_
.?

___

Under Basel 11. the rtsk capital charge have been extended to cover all rtsks:

.....,.,...
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- Slanllanllse<I approad\
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__...._...,.,...__....,_...__,....

✓

Intended for banks
having relatively less
significant exposure to
operational risk
Calculated at firm level
Capital against ri sk =
specified % o f the
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✓
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Standardized
Approach

Basic
Indicator
Approach
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- Slandanlised me1hoclology

- ~methcdology

✓
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Risk mitigation effect
of insurance not
allowed

•
•
•
•
•

Intended for banks having
relatively less significant
exposure to operational
risk
Calculated for each of the
8 design ated business
lines
Capital against risk =
specified % of the bank's
average annual gross
income over the
preceding 3 years
Risk mitigation effect of
insurance not allowed
Intended as entry point
for internationally active
banks.

__ ,__.....,.
Advanced
Measurement
Approaches (AMA)

•

Intended for
internationally active
banks having significant
exposure to operational
risk
•!• Total assets > Stobillion
•!• Total foreib,n exposure >
$10 billion
Rigorous quantitative
methodology
The methodology
developed by the bank
must be pre -approved by
the regulators.

•
•
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V. Implementation of the Accord
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision is purely an advisory committee.
Its members are supervisors of central banks drawn from 13 countries originally
established by G-10 countries. The Accord carries no legal status; therefore, the
Accord is to be given legal status within each country. The precise detail of the
Accord is a national discretion for non-G-10 countries and non-internationally
active banks in G-10 countries.
Pillar 2:
Supervisory Review
The key premise of pillar II is that supervisors should ensure that banks hold
adequate capital. Pillar II emphasises four basic principles:
Banks must develop their own internal processes, based on evolving best
practice.
Supervisors must conduct regular review to ensure adequate capital.
If review fails, supervisors should increase capital charge. This may
require additional legal powers to be able to do this; that is in
jurisdictions where such statutes are non-existent.
Supervisors should demand early remedial action to ensure adequate
capital.
Pillar II is to some degree in conflict with Pillar I as Pillar I is based on formulaic
prescription, while Pillar II is based on principles. Pillar II is intended to
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encourage development and use of better risk management (in contrast to
measurement) practices. Risk-based supervision places considerable
responsibility on supervisors but the accord is becoming de-facto standard
globally. Supervisors should, therefore, brace-up to the challenges, otherwise the
broad lack of supervisory skills are likely to push onus back unto Pillar I.
Risk Based Supervision
Risk based supervision is the key to Pillar II.
Which Risk?
Risk to System is the risk to the entire banking system.
Risk to Bank is the risk to an individual bank.

Rl•k to

Bank

At \M-tat Point Is Your Supervisor
Rute-beaod
auper"'w'l•on

Rlllk -

beaed

mupervtalon
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Risk-based supervision (RBS) is an object-based supervisory approach
concerned with translating economic and other information into potential risk
factor for a bank. It focuses on the quality of risk management systems and the
recognition of systematic risks to the banking system. RBS is a framework with
which banks are assessed regarding the probability and impact of risk as opposed
to the intuitive assessment by the traditional approach. In contrast to the
traditional form of supervision which is biased in favour of risk avoidance. Riskbased supervision treats risk mitigating and offsetting as valid approaches to risk
management.
A risk-focused supervision process provides flexible and responsive supervision
to foster consistency, coordination and communication among supervisors. It
relies on the risk assessment as well as the development of a supervisory plan and
procedures tailored to the risk profile of individual institutions. Risk based
supervision identifies, measures, controls and monitors the risk management
process put in place by a financial institution during a supervisory period.

Objectives of RBS
The main objective of RBS is to sharpen supervision focus on: the activities or
institutions that pose the greatest risk to banks and financial institutions or the
financial system and the assessment of management process to identify, measure,
monitor and control risks.

Benefits of RBS to Supervision
The main benefit of this approach to supervision includes: The allocation of
supervisory resources according to perceived risk that is, focussing resources on
the banks highest risk or devoting more supervisory efforts to those banks that
have high-risk profile. The regulator is, therefore, enabled to prioritise the use of
available resources. The supervisor is better placed to decide on the intensity of
future supervision and the amount of supervisory actions in accordance with the
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perceived risk profile of the bank. Supervisory attention will also focus on banks
whose failure could precipitate systematic crises.
Unresolved Pillar 2 Issues
Home Vs host government is the most pressing
Where there is a difference in implementation between home and host supervision
especially in some advanced methods of operational risk, some international
banks would like approval in one jurisdiction accepted (with minimum review) in
another as total regulatory capital is likely to be less than the sum across
jurisdictions. Some methods of apportionment have been suggested but as capital

is not freely transferable apportionment need to be conservative.
Materiality thresholds should be consistent.
There was a regulatory disagreement on Interest Rate Risk (IRR) arising from
banking (Non-Trading) book, which was not marked-to-market and allocated a
capital charge under Pillar I, but included under Pillar II. Bank for International
Settlement consultative forum have addressed this in its review of Market Risk
framework due to go live November 2008.
Preconditions before Implementing the Accord
Jurisdictions implementing Basie II should have a well-developed infrastructure
including enforceable contract law, enforceable and reliable accounting standards
and independent audit, efficient and independent judiciary, secure and efficient
mechanism for the settlement of financial transactions. They should also have
well defined rules governing the operations of the financial markets such as strong
corporate governance rules, adequate flows of information to market participants
that are accurate, meaningful, transparent and timely, appropriate financial
incentives to reward well-managed institutions, investors are not insulated from

the consequences of their decisions, no hidden guarantees especially by
government, and need to balance systemic protection and business risk taking.
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Risk-based Supervision lies at the heart of the new Accord. There are three basic
concepts to be noted:
• Assessment of the risk of each institution to the overall system.
• Principle-based supervisory process instead of rule-based. This allows
firms the incentive to manage themselves better and in return, suffer less
supervisory intervention.
• Most of the supervisory resources should be devoted to those institutions
that represent the greatest risk, recognising a supervisor has scarce
resources.
The Main Accord - Specific Issues
Irrespective of the regulatory capital regime, supervisors have a core mandate of
strengthening the safety and soundness of the banking system and the protection
of the depositor. They will have a number of competing priorities which will
require legal backing to fortify the supervisory infrastructure. The following
questions are relevant in this respect. First, does the supervisory authority have
the legal authority required under the Accord? Many countries, including EU,
have had to introduce new laws to strengthen their regulatory framework before
implementation of the Accord. Second, does the supervisor possess current
resources/skills? Third, do the supervisory skills require enhancement and over
what framework? Fourth, what is the current disclosure regime particularly to
Pillar III?, and what is the status of accounting and, in particular, provisioning,
especially in the context ofInternational Financial Reporting Standard?
VI. The Scope oflmplementation
Countries implementing the Accord need to make important decisions regarding:
1. Which banks are to be subject to the Accord in terms of?
•
Size
•
Complexity
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•
•

13 1

International presence
Risk profile

2. Which methods will be permitted?
Most developing countries are adopting IRB (Internal Risk Based approach) for
credit risk and Standardised approach for Operational Risk. There are a wide
range ofnational discretions but this need to be set in the local context.
3. What is the implementation timetable?
Select a single date for implementation of the simple method as this may make the
supervision easier and permit migration to more advanced approaches. It is
important to involve the banks in the creation of the local Accord for the reasons
that assessing the current bank practices and general readiness can be achieved
through both bilateral and industry discussions by way of structured supervisory
visits, horizontal reviews that is looking at specific practice across a range of
banks, thus, enabling the drafting of supervisory guidelines which is consistent
with pillar II. An early version of the local Accord may be necessary to enable the
introduction of local Quality Implementation standards (QISs), thus, enabling
banks to assess the impact of implementation and to provide benchmarking
feedback. The implementation team should be encouraging the structured
collections of data and request implementation timetables from the banks. Some
of the discussion should include the sharing of bank data. A well-developed
approval process should emphasise the need for internal in-depth assessment as
well as decide upon the length ofparallel running before switch-over.

VII. Obstacles to a Successful Implementation
Several obstacles have been identified to be inimical to the successful
implementation ofBasle II. The major obstacle is the impact on staffing and skills.
Staffing and skills determine successful implementation of Pillar II. There is also
the need to create a consensus among banks. Whilst the implementation can be
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imposed by the Regulator, the uncertainties in the Accord are better resolved by
the whole industry. There is also the need to create a realistic timetable both for the
data collection and for the banks approval process. The resolutions of home-host
supervisory issues could also be an impediment to the implementation of the
Accord. Other impediments include pragmatism and co-operation from the
supervisors across jurisdictions; their preparedness to share supervisory
information including the mutual development of a supervisory framework for a
specific bank?
Other Challenges
The Accord, which explicitly requires capital for credit risk, does not have an
explicit capital charge for operational risk. Nevertheless, the Basel Committee
recognized when developing the Accord that banks incurred risks other than
credit risk, including operational risk, and thus calibrated the Accord so that the
8.0 per cent minimum capital requirement included a buffer for such risks. More
recently (based on the development of a more credit risk-sensitive capital
framework) a view has been canvassed that operational risk was significant and
increasing in the banking industry and recognition that a number of sophisticated
banks were allocating significant amounts of internal capital to operational risk.
Therefore, the Basel Committee proposed an explicit regulatory capital charge for
operational risk in the revised Basel Capital Accord. A major challenge in
operational management is in defining operational risk.
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One of th• key challenges In operational risk management Is defining
operational risk...

• asal II Definition
Operational Risk ls the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed Internal
processes. people and systems or from external events exdudlng strategic
and reputatlonal

~~----Human"rr.,_

._...__...,..__,,.....___,,_......,___,..................,.
As can be seen above, operational risk occurs in all facets of the business. The
knowledge of the business is required to be able to distinguish between business
risk and operational risk.
A far greater challenge is the organizational and cultural issues which tend to
conflict with the management of operational risk.

The realms of risk

In managing Operational Risk,
c..;an.isa,-•ona anJ cu tural issues
ultimately pose f,reater challenges than
the evolving technical hurdles that
Operational Risk Managers must overcome
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Factors external to the organization could impact on the way operational risk is
measured and managed. In the event of hyper-competition, some operational risk
issues could be compromised. The nine external factors stated below could affect
operational management and measurement. The occurrence of any of the stated
event will alter the normal operation of the bank and may be difficult to capture as
an operation event.

Operational risk management and measurement could seriously be challenged
during periods of dynamic continuous change either in regulatory policies or in
the operations of the entity
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Market Risk Challenges
The dearth of knowledge in treasury operations and market risk is a big challenge
in implementing market risk which has relied on advanced measuring approach
using value at risk (VaR) for most jurisdictions. Inappropriate use ofVaR has been
a major discourse lately and several measures have been exposed to make VaR
effective in the proposed changes to the Basie II market risk framework. Some of
the changes include the decision to capture not only defaults but a wider range of
incremental risks in the incremental risk capital charge. The improvements in the
Basel II Framework concerning internal value-at-risk models will in particular
require banks to justify any factors used in pricing which are left out in the
calculation ofVaR. They will also be required to use hypothetical back-testing at
least for validation, to update monthly market data and to be in a position to update
it in a more timely fashion if deemed necessary. They should work co-operatively
to ensure an efficient approval process and the use of an internal model will be
conditional upon the explicit approval of the bank's supervisory authority. The
home and host country supervisory authorities of banks that carry out material
trading activities in multiple jurisdictions should work co-operatively to ensure
an efficient approval process.

IMF and World Bank: Consideration for Sub-Saharan African Countries
There is a serious consideration by the IMF and the World Bank for Sub-Saharan
African countries intending to adopt Basel II. Such countries were required to
look inwards at their internal processes and to avoid "adoption at all costs
approach". Their priority should be to ensure financial sector safety and
soundness by ensuring compliance with Basie I, Basel core principles,
International Financial Reporting Standards, e.t.c. Thus, Financial Sector
Assessment Programmes (FSAP's) and Article 4 assessments will not negatively
score non-adoption of Bil for such countries but once they have decided to adopt
Bil will score the quality of adoption plans and implementation. The risk of
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adoption will involve negative assessments, rating downgrades, limited access to
international finance, limit to foreign investments e.t.c.
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VIII. Conclusion
The new accord has been broadly welcomed by financial community, particularly
the increased sensitivity and the permitted use of advanced models. There are
concerns about the vagueness of the operational risk and there are also concerns
about the homogeneity of regulation. Its implementation requires structured
approach. What is required for the regulatory authorities in Nigeria is to
strengthen the Basie II committee with a clear mandate and timelines. It is
gladdening to note that most deposit money banks have taken their Basie II
compliance levels higher. The challenges can be surmounted through concerted
effort on the part of stakeholders in banking and finance industry through the
creation of standards. The industry is gradually and continually embracing the
Basie II tenets, therefore, full implementation and cut-over will not pose serious
problems.
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